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Abstract
This study analyzes the effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditure in a sample of
French firms during the period 1993-2009. We evaluate whether there is any input additionality of public
R&D subsidies by distinguishing between R&D tax credit recipient and non-recipient firms. In addition,
combining difference-in-differences with propensity score and exact (both simple and categorical) matching
methods, we assess the effect of R&D subsidies between treated (subsidy recipients) and controls (subsidy
non-recipients) as well as between differently treated (small, medium and large subsidy recipient) firms.
Furthermore, we implement a dose-response matching approach to determine the optimality of public
R&D subsidy provisions. We find evidence of either no additionality or substitution effects between
public and private R&D expenditure. Crowding-out effects appear to be more pronounced for medium-
high levels of public subsidies, and generally under the R&D tax credit regime. A number of robustness
checks corroborate our main findings.
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1 Introduction
Public support to private R&D investments is theoretically grounded in market failures associated with the
incomplete appropriation of the returns to R&D investments. The role of public policy is then to remedy to
this negative externality and propel private R&D investments to an optimal social level. The justification
of public intervention has gained further momentum in the recent macroeconomic literature, which accounts
for a far richer interplay of externalities characterizing R&D activities (Temple, 2003; Montmartin and
Massard, 2015).1 Whereas the macroeconomic approach evaluates the effectiveness of policies at the sectoral
or country level, allowing also for spatial spillovers (Montmartin and Herrera, 2015), the rich microeconomic
empirical literature - which our study contributes to - focuses on the role of a specific measure of financial
support to R&D to increase firms’ levels of R&D investments. This role could not be more apparent than
in the recent economic crisis. As noted by the OECD (2013), many governments have adopted a number of
measures aimed at supporting firms’ innovation. These measures reflect the conviction of policy makers that
an adequate level of innovation is not only crucial to business success, but it is also a decisive factor to recover
from the downturn.2 However - even if governments allocate public resources in favor of those projects that
would not have been realized in the absence of public support (crowding-in or additionality),3 it is plausible
that eligible firms simply substitute R&D investments they originally planned to undertake with the public
financial resources made available (crowding-out), undermining the argument for “additional” effects of public
aid. To strike a balance between “crowding-in” and “crowding-out” effects that typically plague such public
policies, policy makers are assigned the tasks of designing (i) the eligibility criteria allowing firms to benefit
from a public R&D grant, (ii) the modulation of public intervention, and (iii) the optimal policy mix to
achieve defined technology policy objectives.
Considerable volumes of resources are spent each year in R&D public funding, and not surprisingly, the
academic debate has focused on the analysis of those policies and, in particular, on the assessment of their
effectiveness. Evaluating the extent of the economic payoff of a public grant to R&D is basically an empirical
question, but assessing its impact is a challenging task. The main problems are due to the difficulties faced a)
in controlling for selection bias, b) in discriminating the potential different effects induced by heterogeneous
treatment levels provided to firms through the R&D public subsidy, and c) in isolating the effects of the
subsidies from the other confounding factors such as the contextual implementation of other R&D policies.
Different from many existing studies, our empirical analysis aims at addressing these concerns. We argue
that an overall assessment of public grant support to R&D activities should evaluate not only the advisability
1See also Reis and Sequeira (2007), Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005).
2In line with this argument, Autio and Rannikko (2016) find that the impact of a Finnish high-growth entrepreneurship
policy initiative (NIY programme) enhanced new firm growth, being robust against the post-2008 global financial crisis.
3For the use of this terminology – “crowding-in” - see Diamond (1999), p. 424.
2
of public support but also its modulation as well as the presence of other unobserved contextual factors
(among which the contextual presence of different R&D policy tools is the most obvious), equally important
aspects, yet under-studied in this literature.4 Thus, to investigate the implications of the modulation of
public R&D subsidies along different dimensions, we divide recipient firms into a number of groups defined
in terms of the percentile (tercile) of the public subsidy received. First, we simply consider how different
(small, medium or large) amounts of R&D grants impact the advisability of public R&D. By comparing R&D
outcomes between similar funded and not funded firms or between similar but differently funded firms, we
can establish which groups of recipients are primarily contributing to the growth of R&D investment in the
economy. The outcome variables we look at are both the (log-) level and growth of private R&D expenditure.
Interestingly, the comparison of results in level and growth allows us to identify the potential bias due to the
correlation between the firm-specific unobservable term and the treatment variable. As highlighted in solid
and recent development of policy evaluation methods in empirical microeconomics (Blundell and Costa Dias,
2000; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009) as well as in key contributions in the literature on the R&D public
funding (Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Görg et al., 2008), the implementation of matching methods with outcome
variables in first differences may remove any potential bias due to time-invariant firm-specific factors that
the available data do not allow one to control for. Furthermore, and more importantly, matching firms on
their pre-treatment characteristics in each observational year, we control for time-varying observables, which
may well proxy time-varying unobservables that potentially affect the treatment and the outcome variables
simultaneously. Employing a categorical treatment evaluation scheme, we compare publicly financed firms
with similar characteristics across different groups. Our econometric exercise is implemented by combining
both propensity score and exact matching techniques.5 Whereas the former is computed on all observables,
the latter allows us to further strengthen the precision of the comparison by fixing an exact matching among
a number of categories (e.g., firm size, industry, and past recipient status). The policy relevance of these
comparisons is hard to question, as it is needed to determine whether firms benefiting from the largest
amounts of public funding are also investing more in R&D. If this is not the case, then public authorities may
improve their policy targeting through funds re-allocation among recipients. Second, we turn to the question
of determining the proper modulation of R&D public financing. By means of the continuous (dose-response)
treatment matching scheme,6 we can evaluate the effect of further increasing the public grant on private
R&D expenditure, as this method can identify the marginal effects of subsidies and their optimal amounts.
The amount at which the public support ceases to be beneficial can therefore be determined. Third, we
4See Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) and Aerts and Schmidt (2008).
5See Leuven and Sianesi (2014), and Abadie et al. (2004) for statistical packages performing propensity score and exact
matching methods, respectively.
6See Bia and Mattei (2008).
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do not test the effects of the R&D subsidy in isolation only, but we test the impact of the R&D subsidy
under the provision of tax credits to R&D performers. Specifically, R&D subsidy recipients are compared
with non-recipients as well as with firms benefiting contextually from R&D subsidies and R&D tax credits.
Finally, by taking advantage of an unusual characteristic of the R&D national policy in France that created
the conditions for a policy change, notable discontinuities in the average R&D tax credit clearly emerged
in 2004 and 2008, which were the years of major reshaping of this policy tool by the French authorities,
we can strengthen the causal interpretation of our findings by incorporating considerations relative to the
exploitation of exogenous variations in the public R&D provision.
In our empirical analysis, we find evidence of significant substitution between private and public funds
to R&D, especially for medium-high levels of public subsidies. Crowding-out effects appear to be stronger
under the R&D tax credit regime. Comparing growth in private R&D expenditure of companies with similar
characteristics, we find that recipients of larger doses do not outperform or appear to perform worse than
recipients of lower doses or non-recipient firms. In addition, firms employing fewer than 100 workers or
operating in low-R&D intensive industries typically report more extensive substitution compared with their
counterpart samples. Examining the effects for specific amounts of subsidy provision, we find that fully
supported firms receiving subsidies between EUR 145 thousand and 1.8 million seem to exhibit significant
lower private contribution with respect to their counterfactual units, whereas additionality effects are found
for few top beneficiary companies (above EUR 10 million). Different results are found for subsidy-only
recipients, which show significant substitution for subsidy doses between EUR 20-55 thousand. Furthermore,
the 2004 reform of R&D tax credit incentives appears to have worsened the crowding-out behavior of firms
benefiting from public R&D subsidies under the new and more generous tax credit scheme. Although our
findings present higher internal and external validity, due respectively to the strength of the deployed empirical
methods and to the focus on a big European country such as France, a limitation of this study may be related
to the coverage of our firm population dataset. Indeed, we do not observe companies with fewer than 20
employees in the manufacturing industries, which represent a relevant proportion of French small and medium
size enterprises.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 briefly reports the literature and institu-
tional background, section 3 describes the main econometric techniques we employ, section 4 summarizes the
data and variables, section 5 reports our main findings and robustness checks, and section 6 offers concluding
remarks.
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2 Additionality, hidden treatments and policy changes
The empirical literature concerned with the evaluation of R&D policies has typically relied on the notion of
additionality as an indicator of policy effectiveness. The concept of “additionality” was introduced by Buisseret
et al. (1995) and indicates the difference made by the state interference in the market. The argument can
be summarized as follows: economic theory and empirical findings robustly support the positive relationship
linking R&D investment and economic growth. Then, assuming that public aid for technological developments
induces private firms to undertake “additional” R&D investments (i.e., firms that would have not undertaken
those R&D investments without public support), it is possible to infer that the policy intervention leads to
economic growth and social welfare. To address the inquiry of “additionality,” evaluations of public financing
programs typically present casual analyses based on counterfactuals, what would have occurred in the absence
of intervention. At the heart of this analysis is the recognition that neither firms that have received support
nor firms that have not applied for funds can be considered random events. On the contrary, firms’ behavior
is the explicit consequence of the policy design, as firms are often aware of those criteria on the basis of which
governmental authorities will decide funds allocation (i.e., self-selection). In this respect, our study is no
exception and follows this strand of literature, assessing the French R&D grant support system performing
an “after the fact” analysis as in Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Blanes and Busom (2004), Czarnitzki and
Licht (2006), and González and Pazó (2008), Hussinger (2008), among others.
It is undeniable that a plethora of studies implementing different approaches and overcoming database
limitations in different ways has generated a vast mix of evidence, ranging from being in favor of “crowding-in”
effects (Görg et al., 2008; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Hussinger, 2008) to being unable to reject “crowding-out”
effects (Lach, 2002; Heijs and Herrera, 2004).7 In a recent meta-regression analysis, Dimos and Pugh (2016)
find no evidence of either crowding-out or substantial additionality effects, and state that the treatment
of unobservable firm heterogeneity plays a key role in explaining the heterogeneous effects reported in this
literature.
Our study partly relates to Görg et al. (2008), Hottenrott et al. (2014) and Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015).
Görg et al. (2008) find that additionality in R&D subsidies holds for small grants, whereas large grants seem to
induce crowding-out. They implement the categorical matching but neglect - one of our salient contributions
- the continuous treatment approach in evaluating the effects of R&D promoting policies. Furthermore,
content-wise, the outcome we consider, the private R&D expenditure, is different from the outcome they
focus on, the engagement of firms in international markets.
7See also Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004, 2006), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Busom (2000), Czarnitzki and Fier (2001), David
et al. (2000), Duguet (2004), Garcia-Quevedo (2004), Gonzalez et. al (2005), Gonzalez and Pazo (2008), Lööf and Heshmati
(2005), Suetens (2002), and Wallsten (2000).
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Employing a continuous treatment (dose-response) matching approach and exploiting a specific policy
design that explicitly distinguishes between research and development grants, Hottenrott et al. (2014) es-
timate direct and cross-scheme effects on research versus development intensities in a sample of recipients
firms. However, this study neglects the potential existence of crowding-out, in terms of both research and
development, or one of the two, emerging from the comparison with non-funded firms.
Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) argue that the framework created by the matching methodologies can suffer
from serious limitations due to unobserved variables that can act as potential confounding factors in the
analysis. In particular, their focus concerns the role played by other R&D policies that if remain unobserved
can act as “hidden treatments” on the outcome variable and lead to biased estimations. To cope with this issue,
they employ only a standard matching technique in which three R&D policy instruments (i.e., R&D subsidy,
innovative public procurement and R&D tax credit) are considered as treatment variables and evaluated first
in isolation and then in combination with each other. As a consequence, Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) neither
inform on the effects arising from the comparison between differently treated groups of recipient firms nor
provide evidence on the optimal treatment dose of each R&D policy instrument in isolation or combination
with the others.
In addition, all three mentioned studies do not fully address bias associated with either time invariant
or time varying firm-specific effects. We address both sources of unobserved heterogeneity by employing
a DID in combination with matching technique approaches. Specifically, taking the first differences in our
outcome variable, we remove the time invariant unobserved component, and performing a matching between
treated and controls in each observational year (which is the frequency of our panel data), we make sure
that comparisons include all observable within-firm changes occurring on an annual basis, which are likely to
be correlated with varying unobservables. Furthermore, comparing DID estimates between two consecutive
years, we can identify causal effects of policy changes introduced by public authorities.
Indeed, the French public R&D funding system is particularly apt for the empirical evaluation proposed
in this study. France is among the European countries with the highest budget devoted to the distribution
of public R&D financing toward private companies. Public authorities have been implementing both direct
and indirect R&D policy instruments for business R&D. Since the early 1990s, the French government has
introduced several reforms, whose goal has been the creation of a proper framework for boosting innovation.
R&D public resources have been distributed on the basis of predetermined criteria such as the level of risk
and innovativeness of the proposed projects, the promotion of university-firm collaborations, and the support
of new high-tech firm formation, especially when associated with young innovative entrepreneurial projects.
Moreover, to reach the target of R&D spending (at least 3% of GDP) of the Lisbon strategy, since 2004, a
substantial portion of public funding (with annual average investments of EUR 450 million) has targeted the
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“Pôles de compétitivité”, which consist of dynamic and competitive clusters of France, often focused on the
investments in advanced technological areas such as biotechnology and nanotechnology. This policy change
made available R&D grants for projects designed to boost collaborative R&D networks (favoring technological
transfers as well as other entities such as Public Research Organizations).
The year 2004 has been characterized by a further and most likely more impressive reform of the French
public R&D funding system, related to the R&D tax credit. Until 2004, the French tax credit was an
incremental tax credit scheme set at the 50% rate and defined as follows: [0.5 ∗ (R&Dt −R&Dt−1)]. In 2004
this policy tool has been re-defined as a combination of level and incremental tax credit: [0.65 ∗ (R&Dt) +
0.45 ∗ (R&Dt−1 −R&Dt−2)],8 in the spirit of the R&D tax credit adopted in other countries such as Japan,
South Korea, Portugal and Spain. The ceiling of approximately EUR 0.5 million in 1983 reached EUR 8
million in 2004 and EUR 16 million in 2007.
Due to the 2007-2009 financial and economic crisis, the GDP decline has often been followed by a sub-
stantial drop in long-term investments in innovation (Filipetti and Archibugi, 2011; Archibugi et al., 2013)
and a rising fear of industrial R&D delocalization. France, as have many countries, considered public R&D
spending as a strategic policy to counteract the effects of the recent economic downturn, in spite of bud-
getary pressures due to the rising deficit and debt.9 Specifically, in 2008, the French government decided to
eliminate the existing ceiling and the incremental component of the R&D tax credit with the objective of
pushing firms to invest more resources in R&D activities. This transformed the French R&D tax credit into
the most generous scheme among OECD countries (OECD, 2009).
3 Methodology
This section briefly discusses the estimation strategies implemented in our empirical assessment of public R&D
subsidies in the absence or combination of tax credit policies. Taking advantage of recent advancements in
program evaluation analysis, we have combined the categorical (both pscore and exact version) and continuous
(dose-response) treatment matching schemes. The inclination to reduce biases arising from non-random
assignments makes these methods widely utilized in the field of causal inference in observational studies. To
provide some insight into the methodology as well as to discuss the strengths and the weaknesses of each
method, we discuss them separately.
8The balance between the level and the incremental components was subsequently modified in 2006 with 10% and 40% rates,
respectively. Further changes have also been introduced since 2008: the regular 30% rate has been applied up to EUR 100
million and dropped to 5% beyond this threshold. However, firms applying for the first time could benefit from a 50% rate in
the first year and a 40% in the second year.
9Academic articles on this matter empirically show that government transfers and subsidies became substantially more
countercyclical (Galí, 1994), and increasing public investments in R&D were invoked. The crucial role of R&D public financing
was therefore justified not only in light of the cited market failure argument but also because of the pro-cyclical character of
private R&D investments.
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3.1 Categorical Treatment Matching
It is tautological that the final R&D spending will depend on the amount of the public support received
by a firm. However, coupling the information on the R&D support receipt by a firm with the information
on the amount received opens the prospective of an analysis based on the categorical treatment matching.
The categorical (propensity score and exact) matching evaluates the expected class of treatment a firm may
receive given the pre-treatment variables. Consistent with the rationale of the dichotomous matching, the
estimation of the public intervention impact is based on the comparison of firms with similar scores (and
given some exactly similar pre-treatment characteristics in the exact matching), but belonging to two different
classes or categories. In our study, these categories are defined by looking at the terciles of the distribution
of public R&D funding (i.e., small, medium, and large categories). It surely represents an objective rule, and
therefore, it is not subject to being fully arbitrary and potentially misleading categorization criteria. In fact,
we face the trade-off between the number of groups analyzed with the observations available in each group. If
the number of observations is not sufficient, not only estimates lose efficiency, but the estimation method also
becomes unfeasible due to the lack of a common support. This limit may not affect the continuous matching
method because it approximates the distribution of public funds according to a normal density function.
The categorical matching estimation method is well suited for comparisons not only between two categories
of treated groups but also between treated and untreated (which is not allowed in the continuous treatment
case) groups. It helps a lot in understanding whether a given effect obtained from the single-treatment
framework is simply driven by a single category of treated or it is concretely confirmed for all categories, i.e.,
the homogeneity of treatment in the last case may represent a more plausible and acceptable assumption
than in the simple dichotomous matching.
Thus, we have the outcome
{
Y 0, Y 1, Y 2, Y 3
}
of 4 different mutually exclusive treatment categories,
where the 0 − category is exclusively composed of untreated, the 1−, 2−, and 3 − category are the small,
medium, and large subsidy recipient categories. Obviously, we can observe only a realization of the potential
outcome vector; the remaining ones are counterfactuals. To estimate the different treatment effects, the
unconfoundedness and common support assumptions must be satisfied. Given the covariates, whereas the
unconfoundedness requires the treatment indicator to be independent of the realized outcomes, the common
support ensures finding a counterpart in the comparison group, which is addressed by the computation of the
propensity score. In this regard, a practical suggestion is that the existence of differently treated units can
be ignored in a given pairwise category comparison because they are not needed for identification purposes.
For the implementation of the categorical matching, we must run as many probit estimations as the
number of effects we are interested in. Therefore, once identified the probability of receiving a given subsidy
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size compared with another one (e.g., small vs. medium), conditional on the set of pre-treatment covariates,
it is possible to compute the associated treatment effect. Counterfactuals are selected by utilizing the caliper
method (set at 0.01), which represents a scalar defining the boundary of the neighborhood in which matching
is allowed. In this way, we seek to ensure the quality of matching because ‘bad’ matches are prevented from
being included in the comparison groups.
3.2 Continuous Treatment Matching
The implementation of the continuous treatment matching allows us to compare enterprises exposed to a
specific level of treatment with ‘matched’ less and more exposed ones and then to identify marginal effects
on firms’ private R&D investment. The treatment group is alternatively composed of firms receiving public
R&D funding only or those benefiting from both R&D subsidies and R&D tax credits. The control group is
defined as the set of firms receiving lower doses of R&D subsidy (with or without R&D tax credit).
The continuous treatment approach becomes particularly helpful when the number of treatment values
is relatively large because as noted by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), the possibility of smoothing across
treatment permits the improvement of the precision of the inference. This estimation strategy is based on
the key assumption, weak unconfoundedness, formulated by Imbens (2000), which requires only the pairwise
independence of the treatment with each (not joint) of the potential outcomes. In this way, it overcomes
one of the limitations of the so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA) made by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) for the binary case. Thus, the problems of bias removal and drawing causal inferences can be
solved by adjusting for pre-treatment differences. Based on pre-treatment variables, it is possible to compute
the conditional probability of receiving a specific level of treatment (not just receiving it), which takes the
name of General Propensity Score (GPS). An important property originates from the fact that the weak
unconfoundedness given all pre-treatment characteristics implies weak unconfoundedness given the GPS, so
the average treatment effects can be obtained by conditioning just on the GPS (Hirano and Imbens, 2004).
More details on the key assumptions and implementation of the continuous matching method are provided
in Bia and Mattei (2008).
4 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data
We combine six different data sources on individual firms to build our final dataset. Our first data source
is composed of R&D data for the period 1993-2009 from the mandatory survey on R&D (Statistics Office -
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Ministry of Higher Education and Research) collected each year by the Direction of Evaluation, Prospective
and Performance (DEPP). This so-called “R&D survey” inquires into the amount and the types of investments
and expenditures related to R&D as defined in the Frascati Manual guidelines (OECD, 2002). It includes
declarative data such as the amount of internal and external R&D investments as well as the different
external funding coming either from public bodies or private firms. Public R&D funding includes civil and
military R&D contracts as well as R&D subsidies granted by the different public administrative bodies in
charge of R&D policies (e.g., Ministry of Research and Ministry of Industry) or other public agencies (e.g.,
Oséo-ANVAR, ADEME).
Our second data source is the R&D tax credit register from the Ministry of Higher Education and Research,
which manages the French R&D tax scheme. The data are exhaustive and reveal the amount of R&D tax
credit obtained by firms on a yearly basis. As a negative tax credit can be carried forward by firms, the
net positive value of the annual tax credit is considered the amount likely to positively affect the efforts of
firms in R&D investments. Furthermore, since 1997, firms should have consolidated their R&D declarations
and R&D tax credit claims at the business group level. The R&D tax credit files allow us to identify fiscal
groups: the headquarters as well as the subsidiaries they are consolidated with.
The third dataset is the annual business survey EAE (enquêtes annuelles d’entreprises) from 1993 to 2007.
The survey managed by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) reports
the individual characteristics of French manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees and service firms
with more than 10 employees. It provides the main activity (NACE code), accounting data, and some data
on the workforce and investments. Among them, the number of employees, value added, exports, cash flow
and operating subsidies are variables of particular interest to us. Our fourth dataset, ESANE (Elaboration
des statistiques annuelles d’entreprise), was provided by the Ministry of Finance for 2008 and 2009 in place
of the annual business survey, which, however, is no longer available. ESANE consists of different fiscal and
administrative data coming from fiscal and social declarations. The file is not a survey and encompasses
millions of firms compared to the EAE files. Most of the variables originating from the EAE survey can be
retrieved in ESANE. Missing values are, however, more frequent, especially for SMEs. We thus complete the
ESANE data with our fifth source of information: a private database (DIANE) gathering the information
disclosed to commercial courts by French firms and published by Bureau van Dijk. When data from ESANE
are missing, we impute them by utilizing DIANE values.
Our sixth data source is the ‘financial linkages’ dataset (LIFI) that covers the period 1993-2009 and is
provided by INSEE in collaboration with Bureau van Dijk. LIFI provides information about the headquarters
for every subsidiary that is located in France and that is fully owned (at least at 50%) by another firm. Thanks
to LIFI, we are able to identify firms located in France owned by foreign companies.
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4.2 Variables
Obviously, the treatment variable is the amount of the R&D subsidy received from the government or other
public institutions.
Our matching techniques are based on the following pre-treatment variables: R&D intensity indicator
(private R&D expenditure over value added), dummies indicating the decile (from the second to the tenth)
associated with the private R&D expenditure, dummies for positive cash flow, exports scaled to sales, foreign
ownership, dummies referring to the second and third distribution terciles of our treatment variables and other
subsidy, 2-digit industry and size dummies. Specifically, size dummies are defined as follows: firms between
20 and 49, between 50 and 99, 100 and 499 and equal to or larger than 500 employees. This classification
finds justification in the French industrial structure that is dominated by SMEs: enterprises with less than
50 employees account for more than 95% of the total firm population (e.g., Garicano et al., 2013).
Several among these covariates typically also appear in the related literature. The size and industry
dummies account for potential common demand/supply shocks or idiosyncratic shocks to a given company
size or a given industry level, while the other pre-treatment variables capture unobservable or observable firm
heterogeneity. The inclusion in the selection equations of the dummies indicating past public support accounts
for firms’ ‘dependence’ on public resources. The inclusion of both the past R&D intensity indicator and the
deciles of past private R&D expenditure significantly improves the comparability of treated and controls or
differently treated firms when we use private R&D growth as an outcome variable. Indeed, the inclusion of
such pre-treatment characteristics may ensure that the additionality concept, arising from the comparison
of the outcome variables in first differences, is not biased in favor of low-R&D performers. The cash flow
dummy serves as a proxy for firm financial constraints: if the policy maker prefers to support businesses with
financial constraints, firms with a positive cash flow may result in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis firms
with negative cash flows. The exports sales ratio and the variable indicating the foreign ownership may reveal
a policy maker’s inclination to fund companies more active in international markets, possibly characterized
by higher productivity levels with larger potential for innovations.10 Thus, each variable in the selection
equation expresses our attempt to account for all possible criteria that French public authorities may use for
the targeting of their subsidies.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 presents the average annual public R&D subsidy and R&D tax credit for all observed firms. Consis-
tent with what was stated in the section on the institutional background, we observe an increasing amount
10Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Melitz (2003), among others.
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of public resources devoted to the R&D tax credit and a trend reduction in the provision of R&D subsidies
over time. A notable discontinuity in the average R&D tax credit clearly emerged in 2004 and 2008, which
were the years of major reshapings of such a policy tool. Figure 2 adds further information on the level of
average private expenditure in R&D. In our sample, it increases from the early 1990s to the year 2000 and
decreases afterwards. In Figure 3, the average private R&D expenditure for both treated (with subsidy only)
and untreated and the average total public R&D financing to recipients are reported. It emerges that on
average financed firms invest more in their research activities.
Figure 1, 2 and 3 about here
The following descriptive statistics and results refer to our final sample, which consists of firms reporting
positive R&D expenditure both in the current and previous year. Table 1 describes the main variables
employed in the analysis, favoring the comparisons across three categories of firms. The first two variables
listed are the treatment variables: R&D public subsidy and total R&D tax credit. Next, the outcome
variables are the (log-) level of private R&D and growth of private R&D. The remaining listed variables
are the covariates utilized to determine the matching between control and treated. Firms are divided into
three groups: R&D subsidy recipients, R&D subsidy and R&D tax credit recipients and non-recipients.
The control group includes 7,556 companies, whereas the treated groups consist of 2,535 enterprises funded
with R&D subsidies and 2,078 firms supported with both R&D subsidies and R&D tax credits. Although
most of the pre-treatment variables are relatively similar when we compare R&D subsidy recipients with
R&D subsidy and R&D tax credit recipients, it is worth noting that the R&D intensity is much higher for
enterprises financed with both policy tools, whereas firms receiving solely R&D subsidies report an R&D value
added ratio just slightly higher than non-funded firms. In addition, current recipient firms have more likely
benefited from public support schemes in the previous periods. Comparing average outcome variables among
firm groups, we observe that the highest level of private R&D expenditure is associated with recipients of
both R&D subsidy and R&D tax credit, followed by subsidy-only recipients and by non-recipients. However,
this ranking changes drastically if we consider the average growth of private R&D expenditure: non-recipients
appear to outperform fully supported firms, and subsidy-only recipients perform better than non-recipient
firms.
Table 1 about here
Table 2 and Table 3 present a similar structure as the previous table and facilitate the comparisons between
different groups of firms: funded firms are divided into three groups corresponding to the first, second and
third tercile of the public subsidy distribution. It turns out that companies receiving larger amounts of public
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R&D subsidy are more likely to be (a) large and domestic firms, (b) concentrated in high-tech industries,11
(c) former large recipients of both R&D subsidy and R&D tax credit, and of other public subsidies. However,
it is worth underlining that large R&D subsidy recipients present the lowest R&D value added ratio among
the companies that do not benefit from R&D tax credit support. More interestingly, Tables 2 and 3 show
that whereas the average private R&D expenditure increases with the tercile of public R&D provision, a
similar pattern does not emerge when considering the growth of private R&D expenditure as the outcome
variable. This, combined with the similar statistics reported in Table 1, represents interesting prima facie
evidence that if confirmed in our causal analysis, may cast serious concerns on the targeting and effectiveness
of public resources devoted to propel private R&D expenditure.
Table 2 and 3 about here
5 Results
This section presents results based on our categorical and continuous matching evaluation schemes. In the
first approach, we divide financed firms into three categories reflecting the terciles of the distribution of the
R&D support grant as well as the terciles of the distribution of the R&D subsidies under R&D tax credits.
This choice is clearly data-driven because it is not grounded on any a priori knowledge about optimal amount
thresholds. Although the decision of partitioning the entire distribution of our treatment variables in three
almost equally populated groups is to some extent arbitrary, it appears to us as the most sensible option
given the size of our sample.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the estimates obtained by means of the categorical matching method for
our outcome variables, namely the log-level and the log-difference (i.e., growth) in private R&D spending.
Whereas the former variable eases the interpretation of our treatment effect, the latter better accounts
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and therefore constitutes our benchmark when evaluating the
average treatment on treated (ATT) estimates.
The first three columns of Table 4 are related to the R&D subsidy only. The first column refers to the
standard dichotomous matching method in which all categories of publicly financed firms (small, medium
and large R&D subsidy-only recipients) are compared with untreated ones (non-recipients). This simple
comparison exhibits a quite large positive and significant effect of public subsidy provision: on average, the
set of financed firms invests approximately 39% more than non-financed ones. However, scrutinizing the
pairs of differently funded versus unfunded companies, this result is not confirmed for the first and for the
second terciles. In these cases, the treatment effect is either negative or positive but insignificant. Whereas
11This does not emerge from Tables 2 and 3 but is reported in Table 6.
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small grant and medium grant recipient firms do not outperform untreated ones, large grant recipients
invest significantly more in private R&D than non recipients. This underlines the importance of splitting the
treatment evaluation in our three categories. Interestingly, the input additionality emerges extensively in all
other comparisons between more and less treated firms (columns 2 and 3). More precisely, medium grant
recipients spend on average approximately 19% more than small ones, and large grant recipients invest
approximately 82% and 61% more than small and medium grant recipients, respectively. These findings
are in line with the effects of the public R&D subsidy provision in combination with the R&D tax credit
support, which are shown in the last three columns of Table 4. Significant additionality effects emerge when
comparing large grant recipients with less supported firm groups or non recipient companies, but medium
grant recipients do not outperform small grant recipients.
Table 4 about here
However, opposite (mostly negative and significant) results are reported in Table 5, where ATTs are
differences in private R&D growth between firm groups. Indeed, we find notable crowding-out evidence in
almost all pair-wise comparisons for both types of treatments, ATTs ranges from -0.09 (-0.14) to -0.23 (-
0.26) in the sample of subsidy (subsidy under tax credit) recipients. Although negative, insignificant effects
are found when (i) comparing small grant recipients with non-recipients, and (ii) confronting large R&D
grant recipients with medium ones. This clearly indicates that the bias due to the correlation between the
firm-specific time-invariant unobservable term and the treatment variable is positive and higher for firms
receiving larger amounts of subsidies. Because differences in R&D growth account better for firm specific
time-invariant effects, we are more confident in evaluations having such an outcome variable, and henceforth
we report and discuss solely results in first differences. Thus, it appears that recipient companies may
substitute private R&D expenditure with public R&D subsidies. In line with this argument, we deepen our
analysis to investigate the role that different amounts of public R&D subsidies may have in determining an
additionality or crowding-out effect of public R&D financing by performing a propensity score matching by
year.
Table 5 about here
To this purpose, findings on the effectiveness of R&D public subsidies in the absence of or combination
with R&D tax credits are respectively illustrated in Figures 4-15. In these figures, we plot the average growth
of the private R&D expenditure for treated and controls, so vertical differences represent the treatment effects
(ATTs). The presence of dots reveals that the computed ATT for a given year is statistically significant (at
least) at the 10% level. The use of such graphs facilitates the comparison of ATTs over time and allows
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for an evaluation of the effects induced by sharp changes (discontinuities) in the provision of R&D public
support, i.e., first difference in ATT. However, if, on the one hand, the assignment of propensity scores by
year improves the adequacy of matched pairs, on the other hand, a more demanding method reduces the
number of matched firms and therefore, enlarges the estimated standard errors.
Figures 4-9 about here
Looking at the Figures 4-9, we find that in a few cases treated firms perform better than untreated ones
(medium recipients in 2000, and large recipients 1995) and however no later than the 2004 reform. Moreover,
proceeding with our inter-tercile comparisons, the figures display no significant higher R&D growth of more
treated compared with less treated groups over the sample period. The overall picture appears not to change
much after the analysis of figures reporting the impact of subsidies under tax credits (Figures 10-15). Small
and medium subsidy recipients under tax credits do not typically perform better than firms not receiving
any R&D public aid, the only additionality effect is found for small subsidy recipients in 1996. Compared
with R&D subsidy-only recipient subset, it turns out that crowding-out behavior occurs more often among
fully supported companies for the inter-tercile comparisons.
Figures 10-15 about here
In addition to this set of results, we perform all comparisons previously described in the propensity score
categorical matching analysis by employing the exact matching evaluation approach. The main difference
between these two methods is that in the latter version, we impose an exact matching among a number of
pre-treatment covariates: size, industry, (R&D tax credit, R&D subsidy and other subsidy) recipient status,
private R&D deciles dummies, exporter status, and foreign ownership dummies. We report in Figures A1-A6
(A7-A12) the effects of R&D subsidies in the absence of (combination with) R&D tax credit. These graphs
report ATTs (differences in average R&D growth between treated and controls) by year. Overall, the exact
matching findings are in line with the propensity score findings, confirming in particular the crowding-out
effects in the after-reform period.
As stated above, we complement these results from the inter-tercile (i.e., categorical treatment) evaluation
with those from the intra-tercile (i.e., continuous treatment) comparisons to add further information aimed
at the overall assessment of the R&D policy. As mentioned in the methodological section, the continuous
treatment matching method allows for the comparison of responses given small increases in the treatment
doses. It implies that non-recipients are not included in such an evaluation because their dose is zero (they
are untreated). Figures 16-21, which refer to this method, report the treatment effect function on the y-axis
and the treatment dose on the x-axis. Obviously, the treatment effect function informs on whether a small
(about EUR 1,000) increase in the dose leads to a reduction or rise in the growth of private R&D expenditure.
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Examining Figures 16-17 (or Table B1), we find evidence of crowding-out or no significant effects of public
R&D provision for doses below EUR 10 million, and additionality effects for doses above such an amount. It
turns out that significant substitution of private with public R&D resources is more likely among small and
medium categories (between EUR 20,000 and 55,000) for the subsidy-only recipients, and among medium
and large (between EUR 145,000 and 1,800,000) categories for fully supported companies. For instance, the
provision of a further EUR 1,000 to fully supported recipients of EUR 1.8 million will reduce their growth of
private R&D by approximately 0.3% compared to similarly treated firms that are not benefiting from such a
dose increase. Crowding-out seems to be more pronounced for the R&D tax credit recipients.
Exploiting the exogenous variation due to the sharp change in R&D tax credit policy that occurred in
2004, we compare treatment effects on growth of R&D private expenditure between before- and after-reform
periods (see Figures 18-19 and 20-21, or Tables B2 and B3, respectively). We find mostly insignificant effects
in the before-reform period, whereas companies benefiting of both schemes of public R&D support show
significant negative effects for doses falling between EUR 145 thousand and 1,8 million in the after-reform
period. Interestingly, it appears that larger crowding-out effects for subsidy recipients under tax credits in
the after-reform period, compared to either before-reform and full sample period.
Figures 16-21 about here
Finally, because there exist differences in the average additionality effects across industries or between
firm size thresholds, as shown, for instance, in Castellacci and Lie (2015) and Guellec (2003), we perform
a number of robustness checks (Table 6) to test whether our findings may (i) vary between small and large
companies, or (ii) differ between high- and low-intensity R&D industries, or (iii) depend on the amount of
funding targeted towards defence activities. In all robustness checks, non-financed firms seem to outperform
large subsidy recipients. It turns out that negative treatment effects appear stronger for “small firms” and
companies operating in “low-R&D” industries. When excluding the public R&D financing towards defence
projects, our findings are qualitatively in line with the main results and the other checks. Although robustness
checks show that there exists a certain heterogeneity in the ATTs among subsamples, we still find evidence
of either no additionality or substitution for both treatments under analysis.
Table 6 about here
6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper is an overall evaluation of the public subsidies to R&D, which proposes an assessment of this
policy in absence or combination with the R&D tax credit, an equally important policy instrument used
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to stimulate private R&D investments. Using a dataset of French companies that covers the period 1993-
2009, we perform both inter-group and intra-group assessment of the outcome of this policy. The former
analysis is directed to investigate a differentiated impact of R&D grants across differently funded firms, and
is presented alongside utilization of the categorical matching method. The latter analysis investigates the
implications of the current modulation of public intervention for similarly funded firms. Implemented by
means of a continuous treatment evaluation method, the intra-group assessment allows us to investigate the
likelihood of crowding-in and crowding-out effects within each tercile along the distribution of the public R&D
support grant. Both methods are coupled with the DID approach to account for unobserved heterogeneity and
results strengthened by a rich dataset featuring comprehensive information on the pre-treatment variables. In
addition, exploiting the exogenous variation due to the sharp change in R&D tax credit policy that occurred in
2004, we compare treatment effects on growth of R&D private expenditure between before- and after-reform
periods, and therefore we identify the effects of such a policy change introduced by the government.
Our results show that substitution between private and public funds may occur, especially for medium-
high levels of public subsidies, and under the regime of R&D tax credit. Recipients of larger doses appear not
to outperform or to perform worse than recipients of lower doses or non-recipient firms. Crowding-out seems
stronger and more significant in the after-reform period as reported in both the propensity score and exact
matching analysis performed by year. In addition, we find evidence of more extensive negative effects for firms
employing fewer than 100 employees or operating in low R&D intensive industries. When analyzing the intra-
tercile distribution of public funds under R&D tax credit regime, we highlight a considerable reduction in
the growth of private R&D expenditure among medium-high subsidy recipients, whereas additionality effects
are found for a few top beneficiary companies (above EUR 10 million). In the sample of fully supported
recipients, it seems to emerge - on average – that firms receiving subsidies between EUR 145 thousand and
1.8 million exhibit significant lower private contribution with respect to their counterfactual units. Subsidy-
only recipients instead show significant substitution of private with public R&D resources for subsidy doses
between EUR 20-55 thousand. Interestingly, when dividing the sample in before- and after-reform periods,
we find that crowding-out effects seem to persist solely for recipients of subsidies under tax credit incentives
after the 2004 reform.
Overall, our findings appear to suggest a substantial re-design of both the modulation and targeting of
the public R&D subsidy policy, especially under R&D tax credit regime. Indeed, the substitution effects
emerging from the inter-tercile and funded versus unfunded comparisons would motivate a better targeting
of the recipient firms, especially among small and medium size firms and in low R&D intense industries.
Concerning the modulation of the public R&D subsidy provision, it appears opportune to move resources
from medium-high to top beneficiary recipients to boost the growth of private R&D expenditure and rise the
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private contribution to R&D in the economy. Furthermore, the distinction between fully funded from subsidy-
only recipient firms underlines the importance of accounting for “hidden treatments” that may otherwise
affect the policy evaluation and favor misleading implications. In addition, the 2004 reform of R&D tax
credit appears to have lowered the effectiveness of public R&D funding. Although this result shed some
lights on the effects of the 2004 reform, it also asks for further research to investigate the opportune mix of
such R&D policy tools. Finally, it is worth underlining that a potential limitation of our study is due to
the fact that we do not observe companies with fewer than 20 employees in the manufacturing industries, a
significant proportion of the French firm population.
This overall assessment indicates that an ex-post evaluation of the targets of an R&D policy is desirable, if
not necessary in a time of downturns or economic stagnation. In fact, if R&D funding is seen as a valid policy
instrument to support companies hit hard by a crisis and facing financial restrictions, it is inevitable that
public resources should not be re-directed away from risky and promising research projects toward companies
that would likely perform equally well without this funding.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Recipients vs Non Recipients
Subsidy Recipients Subsidy and Tax Credit Recipients Non Recipients
Variable mean st.dev. N mean st.dev. N mean st.dev. N
Treatment variables
subsidy 5,150.724 29,415.905 2,535 5,409.341 29,285.294 2,078 0 0 7,556
tax credit 0 0 2,535 1,890.852 5,398.443 2,078 0 0 7,556
Outcome variables
private R&D 25,978.198 104,239.36 2,535 30,650.182 106,742.714 2,078 5,144.934 17,490.953 7,556
log of private R&D 7.978 2.072 2,535 7.997 2.437 2,078 7.23 1.509 7,556
growth of private R&D 0.024 1.017 2,535 -0.098 1.326 2,078 0.018 0.595 7,556
Pre-treatment variables
subsidy 2nd 0.239 0.427 2,535 0.228 0.419 2,078 0.035 0.184 7,556
subsidy 3rd 0.323 0.468 2,535 0.311 0.463 2,078 0.012 0.111 7,556
tax credit 2nd 0.082 0.274 2,535 0.217 0.412 2,078 0.065 0.246 7,556
tax credit 3rd 0.105 0.307 2,535 0.376 0.485 2,078 0.051 0.221 7,556
other subsidy 2nd 0.225 0.418 2,535 0.219 0.414 2,078 0.181 0.385 7,556
other subsidy 3rd 0.415 0.493 2,535 0.43 0.495 2,078 0.139 0.346 7,556
private R&D 2nd 0.069 0.254 2,535 0.063 0.242 2,078 0.103 0.304 7,556
private R&D 3rd 0.083 0.276 2,535 0.059 0.235 2,078 0.11 0.313 7,556
private R&D 4th 0.078 0.268 2,535 0.078 0.269 2,078 0.109 0.311 7,556
private R&D 5th 0.087 0.282 2,535 0.078 0.269 2,078 0.102 0.303 7,556
private R&D 6th 0.088 0.283 2,535 0.085 0.278 2,078 0.108 0.31 7,556
private R&D 7th 0.098 0.298 2,535 0.088 0.283 2,078 0.114 0.317 7,556
private R&D 8th 0.105 0.307 2,535 0.102 0.302 2,078 0.109 0.312 7,556
private R&D 9th 0.138 0.345 2,535 0.133 0.34 2,078 0.092 0.289 7,556
private R&D 10th 0.192 0.394 2,535 0.248 0.432 2,078 0.062 0.241 7,556
cash 0.811 0.392 2,535 0.810 0.392 2,078 0.851 0.357 7,556
R&D VA ratio 0.133 9.65 2,535 0.582 9.881 2,078 0.092 3.533 7,556
export intensity 0.369 0.284 2,535 0.412 0.295 2,078 0.355 0.279 7,556
foreign ownership 0.28 0.449 2,535 0.288 0.453 2,078 0.496 0.5 7,556
size(20-50) 0.085 0.279 2,535 0.084 0.278 2,078 0.079 0.27 7,556
size(50-100) 0.124 0.329 2,535 0.124 0.329 2,078 0.118 0.322 7,556
size(100-500) 0.373 0.484 2,535 0.347 0.476 2,078 0.485 0.5 7,556
size(>500) 0.411 0.492 2,535 0.439 0.496 2,078 0.309 0.462 7,556
Note: Monetary values are reported in thousands of euros and deflated at 2000 year price level.
24
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Terciles of Subsidy Recipients
1st Tercile 2nd Tercile 3rd Tercile
Variable mean st.dev. N mean st.dev. N mean st.dev. N
Treatment variables
subsidy 19.119 11.113 813 111.793 58.225 802 14,078.136 47,546.56 920
tax credit 0 0 813 0 0 802 0 0 920
Outcome variables
private R&D 4,889.533 14,105.364 813 8,752.616 22,634.597 802 59,630.374 165,989.341 920
log of private R&D 7.257 1.485 813 7.58 1.753 802 8.961 2.377 920
growth of private R&D 0.051 0.63 813 0.001 0.77 802 0.021 1.408 920
Pre-treatment variables
subsidy 2nd 0.171 0.377 813 0.436 0.496 802 0.127 0.333 920
subsidy 3rd 0.036 0.186 813 0.132 0.339 802 0.742 0.438 920
tax credit 2nd 0.107 0.309 813 0.086 0.281 802 0.055 0.229 920
tax credit 3rd 0.07 0.255 813 0.086 0.281 802 0.153 0.36 920
other subsidy 2nd 0.327 0.469 813 0.228 0.42 802 0.132 0.338 920
other subsidy 3rd 0.252 0.435 813 0.362 0.481 802 0.604 0.489 920
private R&D 2nd 0.109 0.312 813 0.075 0.263 802 0.028 0.166 920
private R&D 3rd 0.13 0.337 813 0.102 0.303 802 0.025 0.156 920
private R&D 4th 0.106 0.308 813 0.096 0.295 802 0.038 0.191 920
private R&D 5th 0.107 0.309 813 0.111 0.314 802 0.048 0.214 920
private R&D 6th 0.103 0.305 813 0.102 0.303 802 0.061 0.239 920
private R&D 7th 0.106 0.308 813 0.102 0.303 802 0.088 0.284 920
private R&D 8th 0.114 0.318 813 0.097 0.296 802 0.104 0.306 920
private R&D 9th 0.082 0.275 813 0.12 0.325 802 0.202 0.402 920
private R&D 10th 0.068 0.251 813 0.127 0.333 802 0.359 0.48 920
cashl 0.868 0.338 813 0.813 0.39 802 0.758 0.429 920
R&D VA ratio 0.1 0.971 813 0.217 0.834 802 0.088 15.979 920
export intensity 0.365 0.282 813 0.36 0.281 802 0.38 0.289 920
foreign ownership 0.332 0.471 813 0.297 0.457 802 0.221 0.415 920
size(20-50) 0.107 0.309 813 0.1 0.3 802 0.052 0.222 920
size(50-100) 0.154 0.361 813 0.118 0.323 802 0.102 0.303 920
size(100-500) 0.416 0.493 813 0.415 0.493 802 0.298 0.458 920
size(>500) 0.316 0.465 813 0.355 0.479 802 0.542 0.498 920
Note: Monetary values are reported in thousands of euros and deflated at 2000 year price level.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Terciles of Subsidy and Tax Credit Recipients
1st Tercile 2nd Tercile 3rd Tercile
Variable mean st.dev. N mean st.dev. N mean st.dev. N
Treatment variables
subsidy 19.641 11.704 658 112.228 55.495 652 14,524.106 46,802.292 768
tax credit 507.863 1,090.91 658 817.271 2,311.269 652 3,987.182 8,145.181 768
Outcome variables
private R&D 5,936.985 16,721.528 658 12,573.834 59,484.453 652 67,169.795 159,607.449 768
log of private R&D 7.333 1.607 658 7.486 2.126 652 8.999 2.903 768
growth of private R&D -0.002 0.62 658 -0.136 0.916 652 -0.149 1.925 768
Pre-treatment variables
subsidy 2nd 0.164 0.371 658 0.399 0.49 652 0.137 0.344 768
subsidy 3rd 0.036 0.188 658 0.14 0.347 652 0.693 0.462 768
tax credit 2nd 0.267 0.443 658 0.252 0.434 652 0.145 0.352 768
tax credit 3rd 0.242 0.428 658 0.299 0.458 652 0.557 0.497 768
other subsidy 2nd 0.331 0.471 658 0.248 0.432 652 0.098 0.297 768
other subsidy 3rd 0.226 0.419 658 0.377 0.485 652 0.648 0.478 768
private R&D 2nd 0.106 0.309 658 0.069 0.254 652 0.02 0.138 768
private R&D 3rd 0.09 0.286 658 0.067 0.251 652 0.025 0.155 768
private R&D 4th 0.091 0.288 658 0.117 0.321 652 0.035 0.184 768
private R&D 5th 0.103 0.305 658 0.097 0.296 652 0.042 0.2 768
private R&D 6th 0.126 0.332 658 0.087 0.283 652 0.047 0.212 768
private R&D 7th 0.1 0.301 658 0.095 0.294 652 0.072 0.258 768
private R&D 8th 0.116 0.32 658 0.121 0.327 652 0.073 0.26 768
private R&D 9th 0.116 0.32 658 0.121 0.327 652 0.159 0.366 768
private R&D 10th 0.085 0.279 658 0.144 0.352 652 0.475 0.5 768
cashl 0.872 0.334 658 0.802 0.399 652 0.763 0.426 768
R&D VA ratio 0.795 17.107 658 0.266 0.733 652 0.668 3.621 768
export intensity 0.385 0.293 658 0.394 0.297 652 0.449 0.292 768
foreign ownership 0.31 0.463 658 0.29 0.454 652 0.267 0.443 768
size(20-50) 0.112 0.316 658 0.106 0.308 652 0.042 0.2 768
size(50-100) 0.144 0.352 658 0.156 0.364 652 0.078 0.269 768
size(100-500) 0.41 0.492 658 0.397 0.49 652 0.25 0.433 768
size(>500) 0.324 0.468 658 0.331 0.471 652 0.629 0.483 768
Note: Monetary values are reported in thousands of euros and deflated at 2000 year price level.
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Table 4: Pscore Matching: ATT Estimates (differences in log-levels of private R&D)
Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Non Recipients Small Medium Non Recipients Small Medium
Recipients 0.3857*** 0.2312**
(0.0784) (0.1118)
Small -0.1467 -0.1067
(0.0933) (0.1105)
Medium 0.0827 0.1861* -0.0822 0.1249
(0.0980) (0.1022) (0.1314) (0.1352)
Large 0.6714*** 0.8153*** 0.6065*** 0.6173*** 0.8840*** 0.4274**
(0.1325) (0.1495) (0.1497) (0.1869) (0.2128) (0.2157)
Note: We hereby report the Average Treatment on Treated. The caliper is set equal to 0.01. Significance
levels: ***(1%),**(5%), *(10%).
Table 5: Pscore Matching: ATT Estimates (differences in growth of private R&D)
Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Non Recipients Small Medium Non Recipients Small Medium
Recipients -0.1481*** -0.1894***
(0.0389) (0.0515)
Small -0.0572 -0.0446
(0.0411) (0.0534)
Medium -0.1007** -0.0849* -0.1359** -0.1512***
(0.0469) (0.0454) (0.0564) (0.0595)
Large -0.1783** -0.2308*** -0.0114 -0.2558** -0.1650* -0.1034
(0.0699) (0.0735) (0.0679) (0.1216) (0.0927) (0.1139)
Note: We hereby report the Average Treatment on Treated. The caliper is set equal to 0.01. Significance
levels: ***(1%),**(5%), *(10%).
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Table 6: Robustness Checks – Pscore Matching: ATT Estimates (differences in growth
of private R&D)
Big Firms
Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Non Recipients Small Medium Non Recipients Small Medium
Recipients -0.0810** -0.1107*
(0.0401) (0.0659)
Small -0.0331 -0.0494
(0.0475) (0.0600)
Medium -0.0542 -0.1008** -0.0368 -0.0254
(0.0497) (0.0498) (0.0657) (0.0578)
Large -0.1582** -0.1754*** 0.0152 -0.1813** -0.1953* -0.0468
(0.0762) (0.0656) (0.0724) (0.0776) (0.1044) (0.1085)
Small Firms
Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Non Recipients Small Medium Non Recipients Small Medium
Recipients -0.2241*** -0.3849***
(0.0798) (0.0859)
Small -0.1194 -0.0451
(0.1024) (0.1190)
Medium -0.0831 -0.0756 -0.3653** -0.5382***
(0.1052) (0.1099) (0.1598) (0.1505)
Large -0.1855** -0.2381* -0.0381 -0.6434** -0.7017** -0.2169
(0.0943) (0.1308) (0.1622) (0.3027) (0.2831) (0.3282)
High R&D Industries
Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Non Recipients Small Medium Non Recipients Small Medium
Recipients -0.1233** -0.1567*
(0.0602) (0.0866)
Small -0.0118 -0.0102
(0.0692) (0.0593)
Medium -0.1472** 0.0022 -0.1172 -0.1453**
(0.0715) (0.0701) (0.0811) (0.0723)
Large -0.1540** -0.1706* -0.0776 -0.1959** -0.0038 0.0227
(0.0771) (0.0909) (0.0991) (0.0909) (0.1181) (0.1314)
Low R&D Industries
Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Non Recipients Small Medium Non Recipients Small Medium
Recipients -0.2462*** -0.1334**
(0.0642) (0.0626)
Small -0.2068*** 0.0009
(0.0662) (0.0596)
Medium -0.2359*** -0.0599 -0.1171** -0.2767***
(0.0631) (0.0570) (0.0554) (0.0922)
Large -0.2509** -0.0772 0.0349 -0.2663*** -0.0607 -0.2963*
(0.1058) (0.0828) (0.0857) (0.0997) (0.0857) (0.1622)
No R&D from defence department
Recipients -0.1418*** -0.3098***
(0.0388) (0.0872)
Small -0.0593 -0.1227**
(0.0448) (0.0584)
Medium -0.1288** -0.0805 -0.3507*** -0.1312**
(0.0520) (0.0515) (0.0718) (0.0551)
Large -0.2148*** -0.3435*** 0.0006 -0.4157*** -0.1932** -0.1052
(0.0746) (0.0867) (0.0763) (0.1157) (0.0845) (0.0976)
Note: “Big firms” (“Small firms”) are companies with at least (fewer) than 100 employees. The subset of
“high R&D industries” include (i) Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres; (ii)
Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment; (iii) Manufacture of transport equipment; (iv) Public
administration and defense; compulsory social security. “Low R&D industries” are the complementary
set of “high-tech R&D industries”. In the last check, we exclude R&D financing from the Defence
department. We hereby report the Average Treatment on Treated. The caliper is set equal to 0.01.
Significance levels: ***(1%),**(5%), *(10%).
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Figure 1: Average Public Funding and Tax Credit
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Note: All values are reported in thousands of euros and deflated at 2000 year price level.
Figure 2: Average Private R&D Expenditure, Public Funding and Tax Credit
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Figure 3: Average Private R&D Expenditure of Treated and Controls, and Subsidy
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Note: All values are reported in thousands of euros and deflated at 2000 year price level.
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Pscore Matching: ATT Estimates - Subsidy
(a) Figure 4
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Note: Dots indicate values for treated and controls whose differences are significant (at least) at 10% level.
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Pscore Matching: ATT Estimates - Subsidy under Tax Credit
(a) Figure 10
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Note: Dots indicate values for treated and controls whose differences are significant (at least) at 10% level.
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Continuous Treatment Matching
(a) Figure 16
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Appendix A: Exact Matching
Exact Matching: ATT Estimates - Subsidy
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Note: Dots indicate that ATTs are significant (at least) at 10% level.
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Exact Matching: ATT Estimates - Subsidy under Tax Credit
(a) Figure A7
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Note: Dots indicate that ATTs are significant (at least) at 10% level.
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Appendix B: Continuous Treatment Matching
Table B1: Full Sample – Treatment Effect: Differences in Growth of Private R&D
Treatment Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Log-level Level (thousand Euros) Effect St.dev. T-stat Effect St.dev. T-stat
0.000 1.000 0.001 0.004 0.270 0.007 0.004 1.622
1.000 2.718 0.000 0.003 0.032 0.004 0.003 1.414
1.500 4.482 0.000 0.002 -0.171 0.003 0.002 1.260
2.000 7.389 -0.001 0.001 -0.449 0.001 0.002 0.781
2.500 12.182 -0.001 0.001 -0.927 -0.001 0.001 -0.600
3.000 20.086 -0.001 0.001 -1.615 -0.001 0.001 -1.773
3.500 33.116 -0.001 0.000 -2.345 0.000 0.001 -0.459
4.000 54.598 -0.001 0.000 -2.187 0.000 0.000 0.457
4.500 90.017 0.000 0.000 -0.971 0.000 0.000 -1.090
5.000 148.413 0.000 0.000 -1.200 -0.001 0.000 -2.675
5.500 244.692 -0.001 0.001 -0.973 -0.002 0.001 -4.048
6.000 403.429 -0.001 0.001 -0.701 -0.004 0.001 -4.508
6.500 665.142 0.000 0.001 -0.397 -0.005 0.001 -4.381
7.000 1096.633 0.000 0.001 -0.174 -0.004 0.001 -4.273
7.500 1808.042 0.000 0.001 0.064 -0.003 0.001 -3.549
8.000 2980.958 0.000 0.001 0.415 -0.001 0.001 -1.495
8.500 4914.769 0.001 0.001 0.730 0.000 0.001 0.316
9.000 8103.084 0.002 0.002 0.869 0.003 0.002 1.350
9.500 13359.727 0.002 0.003 0.883 0.005 0.003 1.926
10.000 22026.465 0.003 0.004 0.868 0.008 0.004 2.239
Note: Treatment effects (Effect) refer to a dose increase of EUR 1,000. Monetary values are deflated at
2000 year price level.
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Table B2: Period 1998 - 2003 – Treatment Effect: Differences in Growth of Private
R&D
Treatment Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Log-level Level (thousand Euros) Effect St.dev. T-stat Effect St.dev. T-stat
0.000 1.000 0.001 0.003 0.403 -0.003 0.005 -0.527
0.500 1.649 0.001 0.003 0.383 -0.003 0.004 -0.664
1.000 2.718 0.001 0.002 0.384 -0.003 0.003 -0.871
1.500 4.482 0.001 0.002 0.410 -0.003 0.002 -1.109
2.000 7.389 0.001 0.001 0.434 -0.002 0.002 -1.225
2.500 12.182 0.000 0.001 0.401 -0.001 0.001 -1.054
3.000 20.086 0.000 0.001 0.199 -0.001 0.001 -0.783
3.500 33.116 0.000 0.000 -0.353 0.000 0.000 -0.589
4.000 54.598 0.000 0.000 -0.717 0.000 0.000 -0.577
4.500 90.017 0.000 0.000 -0.835 -0.001 0.001 -0.891
5.000 148.413 0.000 0.000 -1.189 -0.001 0.001 -0.974
5.500 244.692 0.000 0.001 -0.762 -0.001 0.001 -0.898
6.000 403.429 0.000 0.001 -0.345 -0.001 0.001 -0.627
6.500 665.142 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.001 -0.159
7.000 1096.633 0.000 0.001 0.461 0.000 0.001 -0.044
7.500 1808.042 0.001 0.001 0.951 0.000 0.001 -0.167
8.000 2980.958 0.001 0.001 1.125 0.000 0.001 -0.024
8.500 4914.769 0.002 0.002 1.152 0.000 0.001 0.056
9.000 8103.084 0.002 0.002 1.162 0.000 0.002 0.044
9.500 13359.727 0.003 0.002 1.152 0.000 0.003 0.094
10.000 22026.465 0.004 0.003 1.128 0.001 0.004 0.143
Note: Treatment effects (Effect) refer to a dose increase of EUR 1,000. Monetary values are deflated at
2000 year price level.
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Table B3: Period 2004 - 2009 – Treatment Effect: Differences in Growth of Private
R&D
Treatment Subsidy Subsidy under Tax Credit
Log-level Level (thousand Euros) Effect St.dev. T-stat Effect St.dev. T-stat
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.009 -0.018 0.010 0.007 1.411
0.500 1.649 -0.001 0.008 -0.085 0.008 0.006 1.383
1.000 2.718 -0.001 0.006 -0.193 0.006 0.004 1.447
1.500 4.482 -0.002 0.005 -0.356 0.005 0.003 1.496
2.000 7.389 -0.002 0.004 -0.594 0.003 0.002 1.174
2.500 12.182 -0.003 0.003 -1.001 0.000 0.001 -0.146
3.000 20.086 -0.002 0.001 -1.516 -0.002 0.001 -1.923
3.500 33.116 -0.001 0.001 -1.339 0.000 0.001 -0.495
4.000 54.598 0.000 0.001 0.170 0.001 0.001 1.080
4.500 90.017 0.000 0.001 0.279 0.000 0.001 0.438
5.000 148.413 -0.001 0.001 -0.802 -0.001 0.001 -1.821
5.500 244.692 -0.002 0.001 -1.698 -0.003 0.001 -3.023
6.000 403.429 -0.003 0.002 -1.559 -0.007 0.002 -3.393
6.500 665.142 -0.003 0.002 -1.615 -0.008 0.002 -3.605
7.000 1096.633 -0.004 0.002 -1.615 -0.007 0.002 -3.322
7.500 1808.042 -0.004 0.003 -1.151 -0.004 0.002 -2.147
8.000 2980.958 -0.003 0.004 -0.752 -0.002 0.003 -0.836
8.500 4914.769 -0.003 0.006 -0.470 0.000 0.004 0.088
9.000 8103.084 -0.002 0.007 -0.299 0.004 0.005 0.766
9.500 13359.727 -0.002 0.009 -0.200 0.008 0.006 1.261
10.000 22026.465 -0.002 0.012 -0.138 0.012 0.008 1.567
Note: Treatment effects (Effect) refer to a dose increase of EUR 1,000. Monetary values are deflated at
2000 year price level.
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